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Longitudinal studies with a mix of binary outcomes and continuous variables are common in 
organizational research. Selecting the dependent variable is often difficult due to conflicting 
theories and contradictory empirical studies. In addition, organizational researchers are 
confronted with methodological challenges posed by latent variables relating to observed 
binary outcomes and within-subject correlation. We draw on Dueker’s (2005) qualitative 
vector autoregression (QVAR) and Lunn et al.’s (2014) multivariate probit model to develop 
a solution to these problems in the form of a qualitative short panel vector autoregression 
(QSP-VAR). The QSP-VAR combines binary and continuous variables into a single vector of 
dependent variables, making every variable endogenous a priori. The QSP-VAR identifies 
causal order, reveals within-subject correlation and accounts for latent variables. Using a 
Bayesian approach, the QSP-VAR provides reliable inference for short time dimension 
longitudinal research. This is demonstrated through analysis of the durability of elite 
corporate agents, social networks and firm performance in France. We provide our 
OpenBUGS code to enable implementation of the QSP-VAR by other researchers. 
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The potential of longitudinal research to enrich organization science has been well articulated 
(Hassett & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013; Ployart & Vandenberg, 2010). Individual and 
organizational actors exist in a profoundly temporal order. Their decisions are shaped by past 
events, and their actions have consequences for the future. Explaining changes over time, 
however, poses non-trivial analytical problems, not least of which is identifying causal order; 
the proverbial chicken and egg problem encountered, for example, when examining the 
interrelations between CEO power and firm performance (Daily & Johnson, 1997). In 
organizational research, three methods have been applied predominantly to accord time a 
central role in theory building: generalized linear modeling (Ballinger, 2004; Harrison & 
Hulin, 1989; Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006; Liang & Zeger, 1986; Zeger, Liang & 
Albert, 1988), random coefficient modeling (Bliese, Chan, & Ployhart, 2007; Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002; Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007), and latent growth modeling (Chan, 1998; 
Chan & Schmitt, 2000; Ployhart & Hakel, 1998). This paper proposes an alternative – vector 
autoregression – which offers advantages in detecting causal order, adding to the arsenal of 
analytical methods deployed in longitudinal studies. 
Longitudinal studies have not been confined to analyzing changes in continuous 
dependent variables such as firm performance, but have also focused on binary dependent 
variables, as in research on CEO duality (Boyd, 1995; Rechner & Dalton, 1991), employee 
turnover (Porter, Steers, Mowday & Boulian, 1974), and market entry (Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000). The problem arises that observing binary outcomes only tells us whether 
or not an event or decision occurred, leaving the underlying decision mechanism obscured. 
Ballinger (2004) alleviates this problem making use of generalized linear models, such as 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). GEE accommodate non-normal dependent 
variables and within-subject correlation (i.e. the outcome, yit, might depend on past outcomes, 
yit-1), which might occur when subjects are measured repeatedly over time (Liang & Zeger, 
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1986; Zeger et al., 1988). A further advantage is that GEE are excellent for assessing the 
impact of covariates on outcomes through marginalization, revealing average responses to 
changes in covariates (Ballinger, 2004: 130).  
Conventional methods such as generalized linear modeling, random coefficient 
modeling, and latent growth models are single-equation models whose “broad scientific 
objective is to describe an outcome, yit, for subject i at time t as a function of covariates, xit” 
(Zeger et al., 1988: p.1049). When a single equation is estimated, researchers need to specify 
the dependent variable (e.g. the response yit) up front, implying the existence of a known or 
readily deducible causal order. This is not true to life in many of the scenarios encountered in 
organizational research. Whenever a change in organizational performance is linked with a 
change in management practice, the problem of specifying causal order arises. Delarue, Van 
Hootegem, Procter, & Burridge (2008: p.142), for instance, following an exhaustive review 
of team working and organizational performance, conclude that it remains “(…) unclear what 
comes first: do HRM practices cause good performance or does good performance lead to the 
implementation of certain HRM practices?” Likewise, Daily and Johnson (1997: p.97) report 
with respect to their analysis of firm performance and CEO power that “performance was 
found to be both an antecedent condition and an outcome of CEO power.” 
 We propose a vector autoregression (VAR) approach that does not require definition 
of causal order a priori. In fact, a VAR reveals causal order after the data is analyzed. Within 
organization science, however, the VAR approach, is not yet established, as evidenced by 
lack of coverage to date in this journal. In organizational research, structural equation 
modeling (SEM) has been favored (e.g. latent growth modeling), and quite often researchers 
have assumed that SEMs can detect causality. But this is not the case (Bollen & Pearl, 2013). 
This said, somewhat similar methods have been applied in organizational research. For 
instance, in their seminal paper on the job satisfaction-performance relationship, Bateman 
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and Organ (1983) conduct a causal analysis applying a cross-lagged regression building on 
Kenny (1975) and Rogosa (1980). Their model (1983: p.590) resembles a VAR with one lag, 
analyzing data collected at two points in time. This constitutes a longitudinal study with short 
time dimension, a research design common in organizational research due to limited access to 
data or high costs of data collection (Pettigrew, 1990; Taris, 2013), suggesting that the VAR 
approach has potential for wider application. To realize this potential, it is necessary to 
overcome the methodological issues arising in short time dimension studies due to hidden 
(and untestable) time series properties (e.g. stationarity) (Binder, Hsiao, & Pesaran, 2005; 
Willett, 1989). In addition, the standard VAR approach does not permit binary dependent 
variables, common in organizational research. 
 To establish causal order in longitudinal studies with binary outcomes and continuous 
variables, we develop a qualitative short panel vector autoregression (QSP-VAR). In line 
with Hsiao (2014), we use ‘longitudinal data’ and ‘panel data’ interchangeably in observing 
several subjects repeatedly over time. The QSP-VAR combines several binary and 
continuous variables into a single vector of dependent variables. Lagged dependent variables 
explain current values, revealing causal order and within-subject correlation. Relying on 
Bayesian inference, the QSP-VAR can handle longitudinal data with a curtailed time 
dimension (Bijak & Wiśniowski, 2009). The QSP-VAR draws on Dueker’s (2005) qualitative 
vector autoregression (QVAR), which combines one binary dependent variable and a set of 
continuous variables to form a VAR in reduced form. Reduced form means that each 
dependent variable is explained by lagged rather than contemporaneous dependent variables 
including its own past observations. To accommodate more than one binary dependent 
variable, we combine the QVAR with the multivariate probit model developed by Lunn, 
Osorio and Whittaker (2014). Extended in this way, the QSP-VAR tests for causal order in 
longitudinal studies with binary and continuous dependent variables.  
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Recognizing the theoretical issues encountered in the context of multivariate 
Bernoulli distributions (Dai, Ding, & Wahba, 2013; Lunn et al., 2014), we focus on the 
underlying latent variable models as suggested by Dueker (2005) and Lunn et al. (2014). We 
address technical difficulties due to the instability resulting from separation using weakly 
informative priors (Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, & Su, 2008). Separation occurs when a linear 
combination of covariates predicts binary outcomes perfectly (Zorn, 2005). Organizational 
researchers use binary or categorical covariates (e.g. gender, ethnicity, occupational prestige) 
frequently. Including a large number of binary or categorical covariates increases the chance 
that a linear combination of covariates explains binary outcomes perfectly, causing separation. 
The problem of separation can be solved in Bayesian analysis using informative prior 
distributions (Albert & Anderson, 1984). The advantage of the method developed by Gelman 
et al. (2008) is that weakly-informative prior distributions are sufficient to address separation.  
In what follows, we first locate the origins, development and advantages of vector 
autoregression in determining causal order, and set the stage for our illustration of the QSP-
VAR. Next, we elaborate and specify the QSP-VAR before implementing it using 
OpenBUGS. There follows a demonstration of the QSP-VAR through analysis of an 
extensive short panel dataset on the French corporate elite (Maclean, Harvey, & Kling, 2014).  
Following discussion of the potentialities and limitations of our study, we conclude that the 
QSP-VAR is a valuable analytical tool for organizational researchers confronted with binary 
dependent variables, indeterminate causality and limited points of measurement. 
 
Research Context 
Vector Autoregression and Granger Causality 
Sims’s (1972, 1980a, 1980b) seminal work on vector autoregression (VAR) has stood the test 
of time, routinely applied as a core method in macroeconomics. Since the VAR takes 
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multiple variables as dependent, researchers do not have to specify alleged causal order prior 
to data analysis. In contrast to conventional methods, the VAR is a multiple-equation model 
which adopts an autoregressive structure so that variables measured in the past can impact on 
variables in the present. The model identifies causal order, referred to as Granger causality, 
wherein the past impinges on the present, without of course the present impacting on the past 
(Granger, 1969). Using frequentist and Bayesian methods, panel VARs have been introduced 
for longitudinal data (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013). Panel VARs are especially appealing for 
research in organization science as they treat all variables as endogenous, revealing causal 
order. Yet, current panel VARs cannot accommodate binary dependent variables commonly 
found in organizational research. We seek to overcome this limitation in the present paper. 
Our model, the QSP-VAR, extends Dueker’s (2005) QVAR to accommodate both binary and 
continuous dependent variables. Drawing on the multivariate probit model developed by 
Lunn et al. (2014), it permits several binary variables that exhibit an arbitrary correlation 
structure. This feature is crucial when modeling real-world situations, e.g. individuals might 
occupy multiple positions at the same time, as we demonstrate in what follows.   
 We take a Bayesian approach to estimate the QSP-VAR, as maximum likelihood 
estimation would entail high-dimensional numerical integration due to binary dependent 
variables, questioning its tractability (Zyphur & Oswald, 2015). Bayesian methods are 
common in panel VARs, thus aligning our approach with existing models (Canova & 
Ciccarelli, 2013), especially those of Dueker (2005) and Lunn et al. (2014), which in effect 
are ‘parents’ to the QSP-VAR. 
 
Research Setting 
To illustrate the potentialities of the QSP-VAR, we put our method to work in analyzing the 
determinants of top executive durability in corporate France. The theoretical domain is the 
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causal relationships thought to exist between top executive tenure, firm performance and 
social networks, focusing inter alia on critical questions concerning CEO power (Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005), CEO duality (Boyd, 1995), board composition (Ocasio, 1994; 
Shen & Cannella, 2002), ownership (Pérez-González, 2006), governance (Marcel, Cowen, & 
Ballinger, 2013), and CEO succession (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998). The literature is large, 
growing and interrelated, reflecting an enduring fascination with the pivotal role played by 
powerful CEOs in the corporate world. Three interrelated themes are central to our research. 
The first is the two-way relationship that exists between executive tenure and firm 
performance. On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that firm performance may 
decline as executive tenure increases, and that this decline is swiftest in the most dynamic 
industries (Henderson et al., 2006). On the other hand, there is a considerable body of 
evidence to suggest that weak firm performance is the foremost cause of CEO removal 
(Allgood & Farrell, 2000; Brickley, 2003; Dalton & Kesner, 1985), length of tenure being 
shorter in highly competitive industries (DeFond & Park, 1999). What is most striking is the 
general lack of agreement on direction of causality between tenure and firm performance 
(Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Zajac, 1990). 
The second theme concerns length of tenure in top executive roles and the 
mechanisms that help or hinder survival. Hambrick and Fukotomi (1991) have likened CEO 
tenure to the passing of seasons, from youthful beginnings to a winter of discontent, when the 
advantages of continued tenure are outweighed by negative effects. The idea underlying the 
life-cycle approach is that CEO commitment to a particular business model yields 
increasingly good results when in sync with the market, but that the process reverses when in-
paradigm learning effects are overwhelmed by eventual lack of fit between model and market. 
The emerging proposition that CEO vulnerability to termination rises with time and that the 
best form of mitigation is continued strong firm performance is supported by Brookman and 
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Thistle’s (2009) analysis of survivorship amongst 2,325 CEOs employed by 1,472 US 
companies between 1993 and 2001. However, risk of termination has been shown elsewhere 
not to rise evenly over time, high vulnerability during the early years subsiding when CEOs 
become entrenched before increasing again at the end of the life-cycle (Gregory-Smith, 
Thompson & Wright, 2009). Entrenchment is marked by a greater toleration of poor results 
by boards of directors, and is especially acute when power is concentrated in the hands of a 
CEO-Chairman (Goyal & Park, 2002) or a CEO anointed by an owning family (Pérez-
González, 2006). It matters less in fast-changing industries like computing in which 
termination rates are higher than in more stable industries like food processing (Henderson et 
al., 2006), and may be circumvented when things go badly by insubordination on the part of 
insider board members (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002).  
The third theme concerns the relationship between survivorship and social networks 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Gulati, 1995; Kijkuit & van den Ende, 2010; Paquin & 
Howard-Grenville, 2013). This recognizes that the power and resources impinging on both 
top executive durability and firm performance are distributed across networks, and not simply 
concentrated within firms (Ahuja, 2000; Mehra, Dixon, Brass, & Robertson, 2006; Useem & 
Karabel, 1986; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanova, 2010). The literature has focused mainly on 
the positive side of interfirm networks (Burt, 1980; Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000; 
Shropshire, 2010). Individuals create ties (interlocks) between companies when they serve on 
multiple boards, enabling two-way flows of commercially sensitive information (Mizruchi & 
Stearns, 1988). Zajac and Westphal (1996: p.254) report that “(…) discussions have tended to 
emphasize the role of such ties in spreading knowledge and awareness about specific 
organizational changes.” This positive connotation suggests that interlocks, in constituting 
interfirm networks, should enhance an organization’s capabilities and performance (Mehra et 
al., 2006). Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) are more sanguine, acknowledging the possible 
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downside that CEOs whose time is scarce might become distracted if outside interests 
become too demanding, eroding the informational, learning and affiliation benefits of 
network embeddedness. Nonetheless they find that for firms facing competitive constraints 
on growth, CEO outside directorships are positively related to long-term performance. 
Recognizing the pertinence of Mizruchi’s (1996: p.277) observation that “interlocks occur 
between organizations, but they are created by individuals”, this raises a further interesting 
question: if the network ties of CEOs are of financial value to their primary employer, what 
might they, as individual agents, stand to gain personally by serving as ties within corporate 
networks (Gulati & Srivastava, 2014)? One possible answer, tested for by Geletkanycz, Boyd 
and Finkelstein (2001) using a sample of 460 US corporations listed in the 1987 Fortune 
1000, is that they are better remunerated. Their study provides qualified support for their 
hypothesis, which is found to hold true for more highly diversified firms but not others. A 
further possibility is that networks enhance durability by providing a cushion against dips in 
performance, enabling executives to remain active for longer in the upper echelons of the 
corporate world (Maclean et al., 2014). 
Research on top executive durability, social networks and firm performance is ideal 
for illustrating the qualities and potential of the QSP-VAR. A longitudinal research design is 
necessary to capture changes in position over relatively short periods, and both binary and 
continuous dependent variables demand consideration. Modeling survivorship necessarily 
posits binary dependent variables exhibiting within-subject correlation because an agent’s 
current role depends on previous roles (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). Continuous dependent 
variables such as firm performance, which exhibit autocorrelation, also need to be 
incorporated (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, & Owers, 1989). To 
explain durability in ‘command posts’ (Mills, 1956: p.4), we need to explain how agents gain 
appointment to initial positions and how occupancy influences the probability of continuation 
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(Maclean, Harvey, & Chia, 2010; Useem & Karabel, 1986). Initial positions refer to the start 
of the investigation period, which we call the ‘initial phase’. The QSP-VAR does not require 
an ‘initial phase’. As in a standard VAR, the initial observations can be regarded as observed 
starting values, unexplained by covariates. In the context of organization science, we would 
like to understand how individuals managed to obtain their initial positions.  
 Figure 1 illustrates the structure of our model. First, the initial phase explains how 
agents occupied their initial positions. To capture the formation of networks, four types of 
positions are considered labelled y1, y2, y3 and y4. Lacking full data on employment history, 
we use a set of exogenous variables, including nationality and gender, to explain initial 
positions. These exogenous variables are ‘variables of fate’ not decided in our model 
(Maclean et al., 2014). Second, subsequent positions form the QSP-VAR together with 
measures of the size and reach of networks, and performance measures. The QSP-VAR 
permits an autoregressive structure so that past realizations of dependent variables affect 
current values. Accordingly, after the initial phase, wherein the ascent of agents to their first 
command position is explained by a set of exogenous variables, the vector of dependent 
variables contains positions, networks, and firm performance, making all variables 
endogenous a priori. This is the main benefit of the QSP-VAR since every variable is 
endogenous, explained by past realizations of all variables.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Developing the QSP-VAR 
We generalize Dueker’s (2005) QVAR by considering more than one binary variable, 
labelled yit
p
, with p=1,2,…,P of cross-sectional units labelled i (i=1,2,…,N) at time t 
(t=1,2,…,T). For instance, if the observed binary variable y21
3
 takes the value one, it indicates 
that individual i=2 at point in time t=1 holds position p=3. These observed binary outcomes 
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(e.g. whether an agent holds a position or not) relate to an unobserved (or latent) underlying 
decision process. Consistent with Dueker (2005) and Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman 
(1985), we adopt the latent variable model presented in equation (1), in which a star indicates 
latent variables. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝∗  ≤ 0
 
where 𝑝 = {1,2, … , 𝑃}, 𝑖 = {1,2, … , 𝑁}, 𝑡 = {1,2, … , 𝑇} 
(1) 
Equation (1) states that the observed binary outcome (e.g. holding a position) is equal 
to one if the underlying latent variable is strictly positive and zero otherwise. We only detect 
whether agents actually hold a position (or not); for instance, we cannot say if they came 
close to securing a position but narrowly failed to do so. In our model, latent variables follow 
a VAR with one lag in reduced form, which is a multivariate extension of the autoregressive 
process with one lag used by Dueker (2005) and Eichengreen et al. (1985). 
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
1∗
⋮
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑃∗
] = 𝐲𝐢𝐭
∗ = 𝛂 + 𝚵𝐲𝐢𝐭−𝟏
∗ + 𝛜𝐢𝐭 
(2) 
Equation (2) describes the VAR(1) in latent variables, where the vector α is a P×1 
column vector of constant terms, whereas Ξ is a P×P dimensional coefficient matrix. The 
error term is multivariate normal with mean 0 and covariance matrix Ω, which suggests a 
multivariate probit approach.
2
 Following Lunn et al. (2014), we allow an arbitrary correlation 
structure; thus, we do not impose any restrictions on the covariance matrix Ω. For instance, 
equation (2) permits that positions at a particular point in time are correlated. So, for example, 
being a CEO can be related to being a non-executive director of another company. The 
equation captures dynamics in the sense that past positions at t-1 can affect holding positions 
at t. It is important to understand that the latent variable model is a convenient way to 
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describe the multivariate distribution of binary variables without resorting to multivariate 
Bernoulli distributions (Dai et al., 2013, Lunn et al., 2014). 
The next step is to combine the multivariate probit model described in equations (1) 
and (2) with a set of K continuous variables captured in the column vector xit with dimension 
K×1. In our example, these continuous variables include measures of size and range of 
networks as well as performance indicators. Hence, we obtain the following panel vector 
autoregression in reduced form. Following Dueker (2005), we use augmented vectors to 
combine column vectors for latent variables yit
*
 and observed continuous variables xit. 
[
𝐲𝐢𝐭
∗
𝐱𝐢𝐭
] = 𝛃 + 𝚪𝟏 [
𝐲𝐢𝐭−𝟏
∗
𝐱𝐢𝐭−𝟏
] + 𝚪𝟐𝐳𝐢𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐮𝐢𝐭  
(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) 
(3) 
We include a set of exogenous variables captured in column vector zit-1. All variables 
on the right-hand side of equation (3) are lagged by one time period (i.e. their values are 
observed at t-1). As lagged variables are known at point in time t, they are said to be 
predetermined, ensuring weak exogeneity.
3 
The coefficient matrices Γ1 and Γ2 can be 
restricted to resemble Figure 1 or another structure the researcher wishes to explore. For 
instance, as we lack knowledge of agents’ positions before a certain point, we cannot use 
lagged positions to explain the ascent to initial posts. So at t=1 (the starting point of our 
study), only exogenous variables (e.g. age, gender etc.) can explain initial positions. As these 
exogenous variables are time-invariant (or in case of age deterministic), we only use them 
once for explaining initial positions. Subsequent positions refer to the model captured in 
equation (3) and hence depend on the interplay between positions, networks and performance. 
The panel vector autoregression specified in equation (3) extends Dueker’s (2005) 
multivariate time series model to panel data. Time series data refers to observing one subject 
repeatedly over time, whereas longitudinal (panel) data extends observations to several 
subjects over time. In addition, the model considers several binary variables with arbitrary 
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correlation structure, applying a multivariate probit model consistent with Lunn et al. (2014) 
specifying a multivariate normal distribution for both latent and observed continuous 
variables as prior distribution. In combination with the association between observed binary 
variables and associated latent variables captured in equation (1), latent variables are drawn 
from a truncated normal distribution (Lunn et al., 2014). 
 Following Dueker (2005), we apply a Markov-Chain Monte Carlo simulation 
(MCMC) to estimate the parameters of the model. Initial values for parameters can be 
specified or sampled from prior distributions. The Gibbs sampler can accommodate 
parameters that should be determined simultaneously but in practice are estimated in a 
sequential process (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995). All parameters have 
uninformative priors and therefore the Bayesian MCMC approach converges to maximum 
likelihood. Of course, researchers can specify informative priors (e.g. based on expert 
opinions), which enhances inference, especially in small samples. 
We need to modify default uninformative prior distributions for parameters of the 
multivariate probit model as they cause computational problems due to separation.
4
 
Separation means that a linear combination of covariates explains the binary outcome 
perfectly (Zorn, 2005). For instance, if all women with foreign nationality hold CEO 
positions, the binary outcome (i.e. being a CEO) is perfectly explained. Gelman et al. (2008) 
suggest weakly informative prior distributions that work in the presence of separation. 
Following their procedure, all continuous variables employed are standardized with mean 
zero and standard deviation 0.5. The weakly informative prior is the Cauchy distribution, 
which coincides with the Student-t distribution with one degree of freedom. Originally, 
Gelman et al. (2008) designed this weakly informative prior for logistic regressions, but it 
also works effectively for the QSP-VAR. 
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Implementing the QSP-VAR 
Appendix B provides our code with annotations explaining each step. OpenBUGS is 
available from www.openbugs.net and can be accessed through R. Bayesian methods have 
been used for VARs, and Bijak and Wiśniowski (2009) have released an OpenBUGS code 
for continuous dependent variables. Bijak and Wiśniowski (2009: 98) define the prior 
distribution for the three continuous dependent variables as multivariate normal with mean 
vector, mu[t,1:3], and precision matrix, T[1:3,1:3]. Three equations explain the 
mean vector, which include lagged dependent variables and constant terms resulting in a 
VAR with one lag in reduced form. Bijak and Wiśniowski’s (2009) code can be used for 
continuous variables in the QSP-VAR, but modifications are needed for binary variables and 
for the use of longitudinal data rather than time series data.  
 As our time dimension is short, it is easier to define each point in time separately 
using a lagged vector of dependent variables (labeled with the prefix i) rather than 
introducing a time dimension explicitly. There are different data formats used for panel data 
in OpenBUGS. One method of storing panel data with two points in time is to use a two-
dimensional array y[i,t] for i=1, 2, …, N and t=1, 2. Our preferred approach is to split a 
two-dimensional array y[i,t] into two one-dimensional arrays, named y[i] for t=2  and 
i_y[i] for t=1. This has the benefit of avoiding double loops for i and t in our code, 
reserving the second dimension for combining several binary and continuous variable into 
one vector. It is easy to convert a two-dimensional array into two one-dimensional arrays 
using identities such as y[i]<-y[i,2] and i_y[i]<-y[i,1] for all i=1, 2, …, N. 
Appendix B provides examples of different data formats and shows how the code can be 
extended for more than two points in time. 
Following Bijak and Wiśniowski (2009), continuous dependent variables of the QSP-
VAR follow a multivariate normal distribution, and the precision matrix has an inverse 
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Wishart distribution as prior. The parameterization of the inverse Wishart follows the 
standard uninformative prior, which commonly refers to a precision matrix equal to a scaled 
identity matrix. It should be noted that OpenBUGS uses precision matrices (i.e. the inverse of 
a covariance matrix) so that small values (low precision) translate into large variances 
signaling uninformative priors. Common practice is to assume when lacking prior knowledge 
that continuous dependent variables are uncorrelated under the prior distribution. 
To account for binary dependent variables, we follow the multivariate probit model 
developed by Lunn et al. (2014), who also provide an OpenBUGS code. Consistent with 
Dueker (2005), the idea is to focus on the underlying random utility model (see equation (1)), 
which implies that latent variables follow a truncated normal distribution. Lunn et al. (2014) 
extend this principle by allowing several binary dependent variables, where their latent 
counterparts are drawn from a truncated multivariate normal distribution. This implies that 
these latent variables can be correlated, implying correlated binary variables. The main 
benefit of the latent variable model suggested by Lunn et al. (2014) is that it can be easily 
combined with several continuous dependent variables to derive the QSP-VAR.  
Lunn et al. (2014) use the code H1[i,j] <- step(Psi1[i,j]), where Psi1 
refers to the latent variable. The step function gives the value one if the latent variable is 
strictly positive and zero otherwise, capturing the relationship between the binary outcome, 
H1[i,j], and the latent variable as described by equation (1). They use a multivariate 
normal distribution for latent variables as prior, Psi1[i,1:Q] ~ dmnorm(mu[1:Q], 
T[1:Q,1:Q]), and show that this prior, in combination with step functions, becomes 
truncated multivariate normal based on the standard sampling approach employed by 
OpenBUGS. Finally, the precision matrix is drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution, 
T[1:Q, 1:Q] ~ dwish(T.matrix[1:Q, 1:Q], Q). Here we adjust the code 
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developed by Lunn et al. (2014) by combining the latent variables and continuous variables 
into one vector of variables following a multivariate normal prior distribution. 
To implement the multivariate probit model, we need to address several 
methodological issues. In Lunn et al. (2014), H1[i,j], the binary variable, is not observed 
directly, whereas in both Dueker’s (2005) model and the QSP-VAR binary outcomes are 
observed. This creates a problem, as OpenBUGS does not allow any node to be both 
deterministic and observed. The step function, step(Psi1[i,j]), is deterministic and 
hence the node, H1[i,j], is deterministic by definition. So we need degenerate probability 
distributions, inducing OpenBUGS to treat the node as probabilistic when it is actually 
deterministic, as a certain event occurs with probability one (Lunn, Whittaker, & Best, 2006). 
Lunn et al. (2006) develop a degenerate distribution for probit models called 
dbern.aux(.). Degenerate distributions are not available in OpenBUGS, only in 
WinBUGS using the add-on ‘Reversible Jump MCMC: WinBUGS Jump Interface’ (Lunn, 
Best & Whittaker, 2009; Lunn et al., 2006). WinBUGS and OpenBUGS are not fully 
compatible. Consequently, we develop our own degenerate distribution based on existing 
functions and distributions in OpenBUGS. Following Lunn et al. (2006), we create the 
degenerate Bernoulli distribution in OpenBUGS by first stating that the binary observed 
variable (e.g. position y1 written as y1[i]) follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter, 
pp1, so that y1[i] ~ dbern(pp1[i]), and second stating that the parameter, pp1, in 
turn depends on the latent variable y1
* 
(written as y1star[i]) through a step function, 
which assigns the value one if the latent variable y1
* 
is strictly positive and zero otherwise, 
pp1[i]<-step(y1star[i]). Accordingly, the binary observed variable and the latent 
variable are related as stated in equation (1). For instance, if the latent variable has a negative 
value, then the step function sets the parameter, pp1, equal to zero. Thus, the probability of 
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observing a binary outcome of one is equal to zero. Evidently, the Bernoulli distribution is 
degenerate as the parameter, pp1, takes only two values, zero or one, making it deterministic. 
 In using a multivariate approach, we need to arrange the variables into vectors and 
then specify multivariate normal distributions. Accordingly, the QSP-VAR combines 
continuous and binary dependent variables permitting an arbitrary correlation structure. The 
implementation of the QSP-VAR in OpenBUGS combines the Bayesian VAR model of Bijak 
and Wiśniowski (2009) for continuous multivariate time series and the multivariate probit 
model developed by Lunn et al. (2014). Extending Dueker’s (2005) model using a 
multivariate probit approach based on Lunn et al. (2006, 2009) is useful, allowing latent 
variables to be correlated. However, Lunn et al. (2009) do not consider an autoregressive 
structure of latent variables, so we must modify the approach to incorporate a VAR(1) model 
in reduced form for latent variables.  
The QSP-VAR requires sampling from multivariate distributions with mixed 
likelihoods, as latent variables are truncated normally distributed due to the step function 
linking latent variables to observed binary outcomes. Because of the inherent complexity of 
the model, computing time becomes an issue. After experimenting with various updating 
methods, a block hybrid updater seems to perform best (Wang, 2006). The following section 
highlights a specific-to-general specification approach for the QSP-VAR. Specific-to-general 
means that we start with a simple model and add complexity as opposed to starting with a 
complex (i.e. general) model (see Kennedy, 2003: 98). We recommend that researchers 
follow a similar route to select an appropriate degree of complexity. This ensures 
parsimonious models, reduced computation time and better convergence. 
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Demonstrating the QSP-VAR 
Data and Variables 
To illustrate the QSP-VAR, we analyze positions, networks and performance in the context 
of the French corporate elite using data compiled by Maclean et al. (2014). In particular, we 
consider four initial positions: top executive (y1), non-executive director (y2), extra-corporate 
networker (y3), and entrepreneur with extensive ownership rights (y4). The third and fourth 
positions reflect external networks beyond the business sphere that are important in the 
French context (Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet, & Thine, 2011; François, 2010; Pinçon & Pinçon-
Charlot, 1998; Stern & Westphal, 2010). By construction, being an entrepreneur (y4) does not 
change over time except by natural selection. Accordingly, we only consider the individual’s 
initial decision to become an entrepreneur, whereas other positions can vary over time. 
The sample is composed of agents active in the corporate world in the seven years 
between 1998 and 2004, a sufficiently long period to capture tenure (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996). To qualify for inclusion, agents must be a main board member of one of the top 100 
French companies in 1998, holding an executive (y1) or non-executive (y2) position, yielding 
a sample of 1,160 individuals. To select the top 100 French companies, we rank firms based 
on an equally-weighted index, which includes total capital employed, turnover, profit-before-
tax, and employment (Grant, 1997). Five main sources (i.e. company reports, Le Guide des 
Etats Majors, Who’s Who in France, web searches, newspapers and periodicals) provide 
information on individual agents. We apply a four-way classification for social class: upper, 
upper-middle, lower-middle, and lower class (Halsey, 1995), which captures social standing 
primarily through reference to parents’ occupation supplemented by information on schooling, 
place of upbringing, and family circumstances (Bourdieu, 1987; 1996; Denord et al., 2011). 
Upper class (class_1) refers to those whose parents held leading positions in society or owned 
sizeable equity (more than 1%) in top French companies. Upper-middle class (class_2) 
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includes top professionals such as lawyers, doctors, engineers, senior state officials, and 
senior business people. Lower-middle class (class_3) was applied to white-collar occupations 
including teachers, sales people, lesser officials and technicians; while lower class (class_4) 
was reserved for parental occupations like worker, miner and van driver. The binary variable 
nation indicates whether agents are French nationals or not. Attendance at an elite school is 
captured by the dummy ES, whereas elite higher education refers to EH. Age in 1998 (age98) 
and gender (gender) are coded. The number of top 100 company main board memberships 
and non-top 100 main board memberships held by an individual in 1998 and 2004 are 
recorded, but subsidiary board memberships are excluded. Non-top 100 French companies 
are included if classified as large companies by inclusion in Le Guide des Etats Majors. 
Likewise, the type and extent of engagement in external networks is noted, including 
involvement in charities, public bodies, business organizations, higher education, sports and 
culture. Overall network size is captured by the total number of corporate and extra-corporate 
board memberships (NUM). The variable SIZE only focuses on the size of corporate networks. 
We use a proxy to assess the reach of networks, which refers to the number of different life-
worlds spanned by a network (SPAN). To measure firm performance, we include return on 
assets (ROA). Other measures such as return on equity or market to book ratios have been 
considered and lead to qualitatively similar results. Bloomberg provides these variables based 
on annual financial statements from 1995 to 2012. Appendix A provides definitions and 
coding schemes. We observe 391 agents at two points in time after discounting cases with 
missing data. To compare the three models, we use the same sample size. Firm performance 
is linked to individuals through their dominant position in an organization. For instance, if an 
individual is a CEO and a non-executive director elsewhere, the performance of the firm for 
which he or she serves as CEO is taken as prime. 
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Within-subject Correlation and Tenure 
We present three models following a specific-to-general approach. MODEL I only refers to 
positions, MODEL II includes measures of networks, and MODEL III adds performance. If 
MODEL I, which only includes binary dependent variables, does not confirm any significant 
correlations between positions, a multivariate probit approach would be obsolete, and it 
would be advisable to move to a univariate probit model. A more parsimonious model would 
reduce computation time and avoid over-specification.  
Before modeling, it is useful to review some descriptive findings regarding agents’ 
positions and tenure. Panel A of Table 1 compares initial positions in 1998 with positions in 
2004, whereas Panel B considers movements between positions. In spite of a seven-year 
period, which is relatively long considering the average tenure of CEOs in the US and UK 
(Brookman & Thistle, 2009), there is marked continuity in tenure; incumbents tending to be 
more entrenched in France. Many agents remain in at least one of the four positions. Agents 
can hold up to four positions simultaneously, and a significant number of agents operate in 
different spheres (Maclean et al., 2014; Maclean, Harvey & Kling, 2015). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
It is important to note that the QSP-VAR assumes stationarity. Non-stationarity 
occurs if properties of a variable such as mean, variance and autocorrelation structure change 
over time, leading to unreliable statistical inference (Kennedy, 2003). As the time dimension 
is short, it is difficult to test for time series issues such as non-stationarity (Binder et al., 
2005). Hence researchers need to take care when including continuous variables that are 
known to be non-stationary (e.g. share prices). There are several methods to deal with non-
stationarity such as working with first-differenced data ∆yit, i.e. yit-yit-1. Using the change in a 
variable or growth rates can ensure stationarity; however, a larger time dimension (e.g. 
several waves of data collection) is needed. 
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Given the short time dimension, we do not consider agent-specific fixed or random-
effects, since including 391 dummies, one for each agent (excluding the constant term), 
would be likely to over-specify the model. Researchers with access to longer time dimensions 
might consider agent-specific effects to capture unobserved characteristics. In this case, the 
approach needs to be modified, as fixed or random effects and lagged dependent variables are 
not independent. The literature discusses different approaches, including Helmert’s 
transformation and dynamic panel data estimators (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Kling, 2005). 
These methods can be also used in panel VARs (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013). 
 It is advisable to commence with a simple model (MODEL I) that only captures initial 
positions, current positions and a set of exogenous variables (e.g. gender). Exogenous 
variables, which Maclean et al. (2014) call ‘variables of fate’, were determined long before 
an agent ascended to her first position. ‘Variables of fate’ might explain initial positions, 
which in turn can affect current positions. MODEL I refers to a QSP-VAR with only binary 
dependent variables. In particular, MODEL I permits latent variables that are correlated to be 
captured by the multivariate probit part of the model (Lunn et al., 2014). After running 
MODEL I, researchers can determine contemporaneous correlations between latent variables.  
To prevent starting values and poor convergence from affecting posterior distributions, 
the first 1000 iterations are discarded (Gelman & Shirley, 2011). We run 5000 additional 
iterations, and tables provide the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of posterior distributions. Hence we 
obtain credibility intervals for parameters, providing more information than null hypotheses 
testing (Zyphur & Oswald, 2015). Additional information such as Monte Carlo standard 
errors of the mean indicate a high level of precision (Roberts, 1996). Table 2 provides the 
results for MODEL I. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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 The interpretation of Table 2 can focus on null hypothesis testing using the duality 
principle. Hence, if zero is not in the range of values described by the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles, 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the parameter is equal to zero (i.e. the covariate has a 
significant impact). Alternatively, we can refer to a direct inference that considers whether 
the effect is practically meaningful or of ‘economic significance’ (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996; 
Zyphur & Oswald, 2015). We can see that occupying a position of CEO in 2004 is positively 
influenced by holding a similar position in 1998 (y1
*
), having external board memberships 
(y2
*
), and being an entrepreneur (y4
*
). Social class in the form of higher social status impacts 
on initial positions when the agent concerned is an extra-corporate networker or non-
executive corporate director (Smith, Menon, & Thompson, 2012). Elite schooling and higher 
education enhance the chances of becoming a corporate or extra-corporate networker. 
Accordingly, there is clear evidence of within-subject correlation since past latent variables 
exhibit considerable impact on current values. Finally, we determine correlation coefficients 
between latent variables. The median of the correlation coefficient between y1
*
 and y3
*
 is 
0.450 with a 95% credibility interval from 0.235 to 0.665, confirming that a multivariate 
probit approach is required.  
 
Making Agents’ Networks Endogenous 
To investigate the role of networks, MODEL II uses the full potential of the QSP-VAR by 
incorporating continuous dependent variables to account for different types of networks. 
Table 3 presents the results. First, we consider the size of an agent’s corporate network 
measured by board memberships, which create interlocks between firms when agents serve 
on multiple boards. The variable SIZE captures the extent of an agent’s corporate network in 
terms of the number of ties. Second, the variable NUM indicates the number of corporate and 
extra-corporate networks; thus quantifying the magnitude of both types of networks. Third, 
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the variable SPAN refers to the number of life-worlds an agent is involved in at the highest 
level, capturing involvement in politics, charities, culture and other spheres.  
We run 2000 iterations using the Gibbs sampler with two chains to check for 
convergence. Convergence is achieved as the chains approach similar values for parameters. 
In line with Gill (2008), we determine the potential scale reduction factor (PSRF), defined as 
the total variance across chains divided by the pooled variance within chains (Gelman & 
Rubin, 1992; Gelman et al., 1995). Following Brooks and Gelman (1998), we modify PSFR 
and calculate the measure for different numbers of iterations. Figure 2 shows a trace plot for 
parameter b[3], which refers to the covariate y2it-1
*
, the latent variable for a corporate 
networker in 1998. The trace plot indicates convergence of the two chains after about 1500 
iterations, since both chains reach a target distribution. Figure 2 also plots the modified PSFR 
for parameter b[2] and the constant term b[1] for an increasing number of iterations. It is 
evident that the PSFR (red line) approaches one, which is below the recommended value of 
1.2 (Cowles & Carlin, 1996; Brooks & Roberts, 1998).  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
MODEL II is more complex and requires a burn-in period of 2,000 to ensure 
convergence (see Figure 2). We discard these initial iterations and conduct 10,000 iterations 
to obtain posterior distributions. Table 3 reports medians of estimated parameters. A star (*) 
indicates whether the 95% credibility interval contains zero, indicating statistical significance 
(i.e. whether the parameter is significantly different from zero). It is important to stress that 
the QSP-VAR treats binary and continuous variables as dependent variables within the terms 
of a vector autoregression. Hence the three continuous measures of networks are affected by 
other lagged dependent variables, making network formation endogenous.  
 Table 3 confirms a strong pattern of interrelationships between the three current 
positions, re-emphasizing the results of MODEL I presented in Table 2. There is clear 
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evidence in all three specifications that previous positions have an impact on current 
positions, indicative of within-subject correlation. Furthermore, CEOs are more likely to 
remain in power if they have been corporate networkers. For the initial period, where the 
‘variables of fate’ act on initial positions and networks, it is evident that social class matters 
in becoming either a corporate or an extra-corporate networker. Regarding the impact of 
networks on tenure, it is evident that in all three specifications past networks do not 
determine current positions. In fact, there is even a slightly negative impact of the size of all 
networks (NUM) on remaining in the role of an extra-corporate networker. Furthermore, 
networks are clearly not exogenous, as social class, nationality and age affect the size and 
range of corporate and extra-corporate networks (Palmer & Maher, 2005).   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The most significant strength of the QSP-VAR is its ability to capture complex 
interrelationships and indicate causal order. Hence researchers can test much more 
sophisticated hypotheses, which are beyond the reach of conventional methods. To illustrate 
the strength of the QSP-VAR, Table 4 shows standard probit models, where current positions 
can be explained by the three measures of networks. These standard probit models assume 
that measures for the size and reach of networks are exogenous, revealing that networks 
explain whether agents remain at the top of the game (i.e. maintain their CEO position). Even 
after controlling for initial positions some measures for extra-corporate networks (NUM and 
SPAN) remain highly significant. By making networks endogenous, driven by agents’ 
characteristics and initial positions, the QSP-VAR can distinguish between spurious 
correlations and causality, in the sense of Granger causality. Hence, the QSP-VAR uncovers 
whether past (and unchangeable) characteristics (e.g. gender, social class) are hidden drivers 
of network creation, which in turn through the formation of networks affect other variables 
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such as positions. Put differently, finding a correlation between networks and positions (see 
Table 4) might be actually caused by an agent’s characteristics as shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Positions, Networks and Performance 
MODEL III considers the impact of firm performance on executive tenure, and whether 
tenure in turn impinges on performance. We consider three measures of firm performance: 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and market to book ratios (MTB). We only 
report our findings based on ROA as other measures lead to qualitatively similar results. The 
QSP-VAR can test whether past performance influences current position, and in addition 
treats firm performance as a dependent variable explained by executive tenure and networks.  
 In a standard model with firm performance as the dependent variable but without 
lagged firm performance as covariate, industry or firm-specific effects can be modeled using 
fixed or random effects. However, the QSP-VAR includes lagged dependent variables as 
covariates making the use of fixed or random effects problematic. If there is a time-invariant 
industry or firm-specific effect, then both current and past performance are affected by it. By 
using past performance to explain current performance, endogeneity problems arise. It is 
possible to overcome this problem using dynamic panel data estimation (Arellano & Bover, 
1995) and Helmert’s transformation (Kling, 2005). 
In line with MODEL II, the burn-in period is 2,000 to ensure convergence. We 
discard these initial iterations and conduct 10,000 iterations. As indicated in previous models, 
agents derive benefit from holding positions as corporate and extra-corporate networkers, 
which increase executive durability. Table 5 reports the findings based on the three measures 
of network size and range used in MODEL II. The findings are consistent with MODEL I, as 
there is clear evidence that remaining at the top of the game depends on having been a 
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corporate networker in the past. Remaining in post as a corporate networker in turn depends 
on holding extra-corporate positions. These interrelationships between positions dominate. In 
addition, ascending to initial command posts is mainly driven by agents’ characteristics (e.g. 
age, gender) and, above all, by higher social class. Moreover, Table 5 confirms our previous 
findings based on MODEL II (see Table 4), as various measures of the size and range of 
networks do not add explanatory power; they are endogenous and explained by agents’ 
‘variables of fate’. Finally, Table 5 shows that past firm performance does not threaten CEOs’ 
tenure directly. However, there is evidence that strong performance stabilizes corporate and 
to a limited extent extra-corporate networks, which in turn affects CEO tenure. We do not 
find evidence that firm performance is enhanced by agents’ positions or networks. These 
findings confirm that the QSP-VAR is a valuable tool for identifying complex dynamic 
relationships between positions, networks and firm performance. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Discussion 
The QSP-VAR is a flexible tool ideal for analyzing longitudinal data with binary and 
continuous variables. The unique feature of the QSP-VAR is that it permits more than one 
binary outcome, and binary variables can be correlated. Given its autoregressive structure, 
within-subject correlation, the impact of past variables on current variables, can be studied. 
Hence, the QSP-VAR can test the causal order of variables, making it unnecessary to specify 
dependent or independent variables prior to analyzing the data. By assuming a Bayesian 
approach, the QSP-VAR can handle longitudinal studies with small time dimensions and a 
limited number of cross-sectional observations. Furthermore, priors can be made informative 
using expert opinions available in some areas of research. To enable use of the QSP-VAR by 
other organizational researchers, Appendix B provides our OpenBUGS code. 
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Ballinger (2004), Braun, Kuljanin and DeShon (2013) and Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh 
(2008) have noted an increasing interest in the application of longitudinal research designs in 
strategic and organizational research. Longitudinal methods, for example, are particularly 
appropriate for studying the evolution of social networks (Gulati, 1995; Kijkuit & van den 
Ende, 2010; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013) and the 
exploitation of social capital (Borgatti, Brass & Halgin, 2014; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & 
Labianca, 2009). Researchers interested in binary decisions, such as those relating to staff 
turnover, could gain additional insights through application of the QSP-VAR. In particular, 
the analysis of decision paths (including searches for job alternatives, the evaluation of 
alternatives, and exit), in which binary choices occur in a sequential order, is an ideal 
research setting for the QSP-VAR (Lee & Mitchell, 1994). Within the strategy domain, in 
which ‘the ubiquity of cross-sectional designs makes it difficult to generalize into and about 
dynamic relationships among strategy, execution and performance’ (Ketchen et al., 2008: 
655), the QSP-VAR could be used in longitudinal studies to quantify the impact of past 
decisions on subsequent decisions, responding to the evident need for more attention to be 
paid to issues of ‘statistical power, construct measurement, and causality’ (Ketchen et al., 
2008: 649). Continuous dependent variables such as team performance could readily be 
incorporated in such studies (Delarue et al., 2008; Mehra, Smith, Dixon, & Robertson, 2006). 
The QSP-VAR, for example, could indicate whether past team performance leads to turnover 
or whether, on the contrary, past turnover affects team performance. It could identify whether 
both effects exist simultaneously and assess their relative importance. 
We have demonstrated the QSP-VAR by analyzing relationships between top 
executive tenure, networks, and firm performance. The literature tends to treat either tenure 
or performance as dependent variables, overlooking the problem of causal order. Moreover, 
the literature argues that networks influence performance through interlocks (Geletkanycz & 
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Boyd, 2011; Mizruchi, 1996; Shropshire, 2010). As agents themselves elect to form networks, 
it is reasonable to assume that they should also personally derive benefit from them (Burt et 
al., 2000; Geletkanycz et al., 2001; Geletkanycz, & Hambrick, 1997; Zaheer et al., 2010). 
Networks themselves are not necessarily exogenous, as they are formed by combining 
positions. The QSP-VAR reveals causal order. Our findings show that it is agents’ positions 
that comprise the dominant force. Networks are driven by the positions and characteristics of 
individual agents. Agents’ initial positions can be explained mainly by their individual 
characteristics: social class, namely higher social status, being the dominant factor governing 
the emergence of corporate and extra-corporate networkers (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & 
Cook, 2001; Smith et al., 2012; Stern & Westphal, 2010). We find that in France 
underperformance does not affect CEO tenure directly, but it does undermine an individual’s 
capacity to serve as a corporate networker, and to a lesser extent extra-corporate networker. 
In the context of research on the durability of corporate elites, these are important findings, 
helping to paint a much richer picture of the functioning of the French national business 
system, especially in pointing to the continuing importance of class and the pivotal role of 
extra-corporate networks to survivorship, enabling some agents to retain their positions far 
longer than might typically apply in the UK or US (Maclean et al., 2014). Without the QSP-
VAR such theoretically interesting relationships would remain hidden from view. 
The QSP-VAR has limitations. Most importantly, we assume homogeneity, as 
individual fixed or random effects are not considered. It is not advisable to include fixed or 
random effects in the QSP-VAR due to the autoregressive structure of the model. Hence, 
fixed or random effects and lagged dependent variables will be correlated. Applying a 
Helmert’s transformation (i.e. future mean-differencing) or alternatively dynamic panel data 
estimators could address this issue (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Kling, 2005). Yet these methods 
have never been used in the context of binary dependent variables, highlighting the need for 
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further research. In general, the QSP-VAR can be extended to incorporate additional effects. 
For instance, one could add other latent variables (such as the quality of networks) with 
adequate measurement models. Finally, the QSP-VAR is a VAR in reduced form in line with 
Dueker’s (2005) QVAR; therefore, dual-causality (i.e. simultaneity) where variables affect 
each other at the same time is not considered. The QSP-VAR could be extended to a 
structural VAR by applying Cholesky decomposition as in standard VAR models.  By 
providing a users’ guide to building a QSP-VAR, we have gone some way towards 
overcoming the ‘lack of familiarity by organizational researchers’ in the context of Bayesian 
analysis highlighted by Zyphur and Oswald (2015: p.1). 
 
Conclusion 
The primary contribution of this paper is to add to the arsenal of analytical methods deployed 
in longitudinal studies. Much organizational research is bedeviled by problems of the type we 
have considered here with respect to the durability of the French corporate elite, particularly 
with regard to establishing causal order when combining binary and continuous dependent 
variables in short time dimension research. The power of the Bayesian QSP-VAR lies in its 
capacity to disentangle and make sense of complex interrelationships, revealing how social 
systems operate in practice without the necessity of crystal ball gazing in search of directly 
and indirectly observable relationships between variables. Our approach chimes well with the 
call made by Davis (2010: p.706) in this journal for organization science to cast off its self-
limiting obsession with a narrow range of theories and to search more expansively for “the 
social mechanisms [that] are the cogs and wheels of theoretical explanations”, going beyond 
“laundry-list regressions” to distinguish between “reflective and formative indicators” and 
explain the underlying processes that animate the social world. 
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Footnotes 
1
If the error term were drawn from an extreme value distribution, it would imply a logistic 
model.  
2
Weak exogeneity means that lagged variables, e.g. zit-1, and current error terms uit are 
uncorrelated. This is a sufficient condition to ensure unbiased estimates. Note that we do not 
require that current variables, e.g. zit, and current error terms uit are uncorrelated. So by 
lagging variables weak exogeneity can be assured. 
3
The default uninformative prior is a normal distribution with mean zero and precision 1.0E-6. 
Precision refers to the inverse of the variance, which is standard in OpenBUGS. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the problem 
 
 
Note: To simplify the structure, the figure shows only two positions (labelled y1 and y2) and 
two continuous measures for networks (n) and firm performance (p). Subscripts for 
individuals (i) and time (t) are omitted. Certain characteristics of agents were determined at 
birth or long before they took their first position. These variables are captured in vector z. 
The model recognizes the underlying latent variables y1
*
 and y2
*
 that lead to positions. These 
latent variables can be correlated (indicated by the covariance σ12 and the curved arrow). 
Latent variables (y1
*
, y2
*
) and continuous variables (p, n) at t-1 explain latent variables (y1
*
, 
y2
*
) and continuous variables (p, n) at t, resembling a VAR(1) in reduced form. We indicate 
these impacts for the latent variable y1
* 
at t-1, which affects its own value, the second latent 
variable y2
* 
and the two continuous variables at t. To avoid confusion, the figure does not 
show all the arrows from t-1 to t, as all four dependent variables at t-1 affect all four 
dependent variables at t implying 16 arrows.  
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Figure 2: Trace plots and PSFR 
Panel A shows the trace plot of parameter b[3] that measures the partial impact of the latent 
variable y2
*
 that determines whether the agent was a corporate networker in 1998 on the 
probability of being a CEO in 2004. Both chains converge to the target distribution after 
about 1500 iterations. 
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Panel B shows the PSFR for b[3]. It plots the PSFR in red, the pooled variance in green and 
the average variance in blue. 
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Table 1: Change in positions 1998-2004 
Panel A: Comparing initial and final positions
 
     
  Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4  
Initial position in 1998 484 388 473 52  
Leaving 184 197 173 0  
  Natural cause 0 51 50 12  
Joining 6 40 54 0  
Position in 2004 294 181 246 40  
      
Panel B: Movements between positions
(a)
 
Initial positions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 None 
Y1 294 36 68 4 76 
Y2 47 181 160 16 28 
Y3 40 95 173 12 40 
Y4 0 0 0 40 0 
 
(a)
 Panel B only considers agents that did not exit due to natural causes. Agents can hold 
several positions. 
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Table 2: Model I: Positions 
 Dependent variables            
 y1
*
(t) y2
*
(t) y3
*
(t) y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) 
Covariates 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 
y1
*
(t-1) 0.22 0.59 -0.20 -0.03 -0.14 0.11 - - - - - - - - 
y2
*
(t-1) 0.19 0.57 0.73 1.17 0.23 0.60 - - - - - - - - 
y3
*
(t-1) -0.10 0.20 -0.09 0.10 -0.14 0.11 - - - - - - - - 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.00 0.75 -0.02 0.35 -0.06 0.46 - - - - - - - - 
class_1 - - - - - - -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.04 
class_2 - - - - - - -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.03 
class_3 - - - - - - -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.04 
gender - - - - - - 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.03 
nation - - - - - - 0.02 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
age - - - - - - -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
ES - - - - - - -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
EH - - - - - - -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 
 Details on MCMC            
Observations 391            
Burn-in 1000            
Iterations 6000            
 
Note: The table reports the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile of posterior distributions of parameters. A set of exogenous variables including social class, 
gender, nationality, age and attending elite school and universities are covariates for initial positions at t-1. Initial positions at t-1 affect current 
positions at t through their latent variables constituting a multivariate probit with VAR(1) structure. Correlation between latent variables is 
permitted.    
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Table 3: Model II: Positions and networks 
Panel A: Size of corporate networks due to interlocks (SIZE) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) SIZE (t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) SIZE(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 0.20* -0.07 0.27 0.04 class_1 -0.07 0.10* 0.14* 0.03* 0.03 
y2
*
(t-1) 0.23* 0.64* 0.91* -0.01 class_2 -0.05 0.07* 0.11* 0.02 0.02 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.04 -0.06 0.35 -0.01 class_3 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.02 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.57* -0.08 -0.18 0.34 gender 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
SIZE(t-1) -0.08 0.02 -1.07* -0.08 nation 0.08* -0.18* -0.01 -0.01 -0.09* 
     age -0.10* 0.02 -0.07* 0.01* -0.05* 
     ES -0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.01* 0.01 
     EH 0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.00 0.02 
           
Panel B: Number of corporate and extra-corporate networks (NUM) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) NUM(t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) NUM(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 0.12* -0.04 0.05 -0.01 class_1 -0.07 0.11* 0.12* 0.02 0.07* 
y2
*
(t-1) 0.16* 0.55* 0.45* -0.02 class_2 -0.04 0.09* 0.09* 0.01 0.06* 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.13 -0.14* 0.23* 0.19* class_3 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.25* 0.00 0.32 0.22* gender 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03* -0.06 
NUM(t-1) -0.15 0.19 -0.47 -0.28* nation 0.07 -0.15* -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
     age -0.11* 0.01 -0.08* 0.02* -0.05 
     ES -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01* 0.04* 
     EH 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
           
           
           
 
           
(continued) 
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Panel C: Number of life worlds spanned through networks (SPAN) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) SPAN(t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) SPAN(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 0.16* -0.01 -0.01 0.03 class_1 -0.08 0.05* 0.07* 0.00 0.05* 
y2
*
(t-1) 0.33* 0.81* 0.96* 0.10 class_2 -0.05 0.02 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.25 -0.13 0.81 0.23* class_3 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.35 0.35* -0.72 -0.10 gender 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02* -0.03 
SPAN(t-1) -0.35 0.05 -1.23 -0.31 nation 0.10* -0.12* -0.02 0.00 -0.04 
     age -0.09* 0.01 -0.06* 0.01* -0.05* 
     ES -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
     EH 0.01 0.04* 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
Note: The table reports medians of estimated parameters. A star (*) indicates whether the 95% credibility interval contains zero; hence, it 
indicates statistical significance (i.e. whether the parameter is significantly different from zero). Each panel uses a different measure of networks.
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Table 4: Standard probit models assuming networks are exogenous 
Covariates y1(t) y1(t) y1(t) y1(t) y1(t) y1(t) 
y1 (t-1) - 1.17*** - 1.18*** - 1.14*** 
y2(t-1) - 0.88*** - 0.27 - 0.29 
y3(t-1) - 0.67** - 0.63** - 0.27 
y4(t-1) - 1.33** - 1.35** - 1.25** 
SIZE(t-1) 0.59*** -0.36 - - - - 
NUM(t-1) - - 0.90*** 0.77** - - 
SPAN(t-1) - - - - 1.90*** 1.71*** 
Pseudo R
2 
0.04 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.38 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. We run standard probit models explain being a 
CEO at point in time t using the three measures of networks, the size of corporate networks 
(SIZE), the size of corporate and extra-corporate networks (NUM) and the number of life-
worlds spanned (SPAN). We first run models with the network variable on its own and then 
re-run models including agents’ past positions. The table reports the coefficient, the pseudo 
R-squared and indicates significance.  
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Table 5: Model III: Positions, networks and performance 
 
Panel A: Size of corporate networks due to interlocks (SIZE) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) SIZE(t) ROA(t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) SIZE(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 0.96* -0.59 -0.70 0.41 0.18 class_1 -0.03 0.04* 0.05* 0.01 0.01 
y2
*
(t-1) 1.18* 5.39* 3.05* -1.06 -0.87 class_2 -0.02 0.03* 0.04* 0.00 0.00 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.75 0.59 0.13 0.74 0.63 class_3 -0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.01 
y4
*
(t-1) 1.39* -0.65 0.31 1.28 0.91 gender 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
SIZE(t-1) -0.46 -0.39 0.18 0.88 2.39 nation 0.03* -0.05* 0.00 0.01 0.02* 
ROA(t-1) 0.33 2.17* 2.60* 1.07 1.43 age -0.03 0.00 -0.02* 0.01* -0.01 
      ES -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00* -0.01 
      EH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Panel B: Number of corporate and extra-corporate networks (NUM) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) NUM(t) ROA(t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) NUM(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 1.36* -0.59 -0.84 0.04 -0.76 class_1 -0.01 0.04* 0.03* 0.03 0.00 
y2
*
(t-1) 2.08* 4.24* 3.07* -1.38 -0.17 class_2 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.37 0.88* 0.37 0.12 -0.02 class_3 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.22 0.20 0.17 1.46* 1.86* gender 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
NUM(t-1) 0.26 -0.32 0.56 0.55 0.55 nation 0.04* -0.06* -0.02 0.02 0.02 
ROA(t-1) 0.36 1.75* 1.39 -0.57 0.86 age -0.03* 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 
      ES -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
      EH 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
            
            
            
(continued) 
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Panel C: Number of life worlds spanned through networks (SPAN) 
Covariates y1*(t) y2*(t) y3*(t) SPAN(t) ROA(t) Covariates y1
*
(t-1) y2
*
(t-1) y3
*
(t-1) y4
*
(t-1) SPAN(t-1) 
y1
*
(t-1) 1.36* -0.59 -0.84 0.04 -0.76 class_1 -0.01 0.04* 0.03* 0.03 0.00 
y2
*
(t-1) 2.08* 4.24* 3.07* -1.38 -0.17 class_2 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 
y3
*
(t-1) 0.37 0.88* 0.37 0.12 -0.02 class_3 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
y4
*
(t-1) 0.22 0.20 0.17 1.46* 1.86* gender 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
SPAN(t-1) 0.26 -0.32 0.56 0.55 0.55 nation 0.04* -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
ROA(t-1) 0.36 1.75* 1.39 -0.57 0.86 age -0.03* 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 
      ES -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
      EH 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Note: The table reports medians of estimated parameters. A star (*) indicates whether the 95% credibility interval contains zero; hence, it 
indicates statistical significance (i.e. whether the parameter is significantly different from zero). Each panel uses a different measure of networks. 
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Appendix A 
Variable  Name Type of variable 
y1 Top-tier executive (CEO or Executive 
Chairman) 
Dummy variable 
y2 Corporate networkers having at least 
two directorships of top 100 companies 
or one plus at least two other company 
directorships. 
Dummy variable 
y3 Membership of two or more extra-
corporate boards 
Dummy variable 
y4 Company founder retaining 25% or 
more of equity  
Dummy variable 
ES Elite school Dummy variable 
EH Elite higher education Dummy variable 
class_1 to 
class_3 
Social class Four categories and thus 
three dummy variables 
gender Gender Dummy variable: 1 for 
males and 0 for females 
age98 Age Continuous variable in years 
nation Nationality Dummy variable: 1 for 
French nationals and 0 for 
others 
NUM Total number of corporate and extra-
corporate board memberships  
Continuous variable 
SPAN Number of life-worlds involved in at 
highest level from executive director, 
non-executive director, public or 
political body, business association, 
charitable foundation, education or 
research, arts or sports 
Continuous variable 
SIZE Size of interfirm network defined by 
the number of interlocks 
Continuous variable 
ROA Return on assets Continuous variable 
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Appendix B 
We provide our OpenBUGS code for the QSP-VAR (MODEL II). Please note that the data 
structure depends on your sample, and there are many ways of coding your data in 
OpenBUGS (see user manual for more details). We provide comments for every step.   
 
model { 
# Model for initial positions: t=1 
# Step 1 
for (i in 1:N) { 
  i_y1[i] ~ dbern(qq1[i]) 
  qq1[i]<-step(i_X[i,1]) 
  i_y2[i] ~ dbern(qq2[i]) 
  qq2[i]<-step(i_X[i,2]) 
  i_y3[i] ~ dbern(qq3[i]) 
  qq3[i]<-step(i_X[i,3]) 
  i_y4[i] ~ dbern(qq4[i]) 
  qq4[i]<-step(i_X[i,4]) 
  i_X[i,5]<-i_net_size[i] 
# Step 2 
  i_X[i,1:5] ~ dmnorm(q[i,1:5], M[1:5, 1:5])  
# Step 3 
  Z[i,1]<-class_1[i] 
  Z[i,2]<-class_2[i] 
  Z[i,3]<-class_3[i] 
  Z[i,4]<-h_gender[i] 
  Z[i,5]<-h_afil[i] 
  Z[i,6]<-age98[i] 
  Z[i,7]<-ES[i] 
  Z[i,8]<-EH[i]  
  } 
# Step 4 
M[1:5, 1:5] ~ dwish(M.matrix[1:5, 1:5], 5) 
M.matrix[1,1]<-0.001 
M.matrix[1,2]<-0 
M.matrix[1,3]<-0 
M.matrix[1,4]<-0 
M.matrix[1,5]<-0 
M.matrix[2,1]<-0 
M.matrix[2,2]<-0.001 
M.matrix[2,3]<-0 
M.matrix[2,4]<-0 
M.matrix[2,5]<-0 
M.matrix[3,1]<-0 
M.matrix[3,2]<-0 
M.matrix[3,3]<-0.001  
M.matrix[3,4]<-0  
M.matrix[3,5]<-0  
M.matrix[4,1]<-0 
M.matrix[4,2]<-0 
M.matrix[4,3]<-0  
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M.matrix[4,4]<-0.001  
M.matrix[4,5]<-0  
M.matrix[5,1]<-0 
M.matrix[5,2]<-0 
M.matrix[5,3]<-0  
M.matrix[5,4]<-0 
M.matrix[5,5]<-0.001  
# Step 5 
 for (i in 1:N) { 
 q[i,1]<-constant[5]+inprod(f[], Z[i,]) 
 q[i,2]<-constant[6]+inprod(g[], Z[i,]) 
 q[i,3]<-constant[7]+inprod(h[], Z[i,]) 
 q[i,4]<-constant[8]+inprod(k[], Z[i,]) 
 q[i,5]<-constant[9]+inprod(s[], Z[i,]) 
 } 
# Step 6 
for (j in 1:8) {   
  f[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
  g[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
  h[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
  k[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
  s[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
  }   
#------------------------------------------------------------- 
# Repeat for next point in time 
# Model for current positions: t=2 
# Step 7 
for (i in 1:N) { 
  y1[i] ~ dbern(pp1[i]) 
  pp1[i]<-step(X[i,1]) 
  y2[i] ~ dbern(pp2[i]) 
  pp2[i]<-step(X[i,2]) 
  y3[i] ~ dbern(pp3[i]) 
  pp3[i]<-step(X[i,3]) 
  X[i,4]<-net_size[i] 
# Step 8 
  X[i,1:4] ~ dmnorm(p[i,1:4], T[1:4, 1:4]) 
  }  
# We could consider additional exogenous variables as in Step 
3 
# Step 9 
T[1:4, 1:4] ~ dwish(T.matrix[1:4, 1:4], 4) 
T.matrix[1,1]<-0.001 
T.matrix[1,2]<-0 
T.matrix[1,3]<-0 
T.matrix[1,4]<-0 
T.matrix[2,1]<-0 
T.matrix[2,2]<-0.001 
T.matrix[2,3]<-0 
T.matrix[2,4]<-0 
T.matrix[3,1]<-0 
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T.matrix[3,2]<-0 
T.matrix[3,3]<-0.001 
T.matrix[3,4]<-0 
T.matrix[4,1]<-0 
T.matrix[4,2]<-0 
T.matrix[4,3]<-0 
T.matrix[4,4]<-0.001 
# Step 10 
for (i in 1:N) { 
 p[i,1]<-constant[1]+inprod(b[], i_X[i,]) 
 p[i,2]<-constant[2]+inprod(c[], i_X[i,]) 
 p[i,3]<-constant[3]+inprod(d[], i_X[i,]) 
 p[i,4]<-constant[4]+inprod(t[], i_X[i,]) 
 } 
# Step 11 
for (j in 1:5) { 
b[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1)  
c[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
d[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
t[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1) 
} 
for (j in 1:9) { 
constant[j] ~ dt(0, 0.4,1)  
} 
# Step 12 
Sigma[1:4, 1:4] <- inverse(T[1:4, 1:4]) 
rho12 <- Sigma[1, 2]/sqrt(Sigma[1, 1]*Sigma[2, 2])  
rho13 <- Sigma[1, 3]/sqrt(Sigma[1, 1]*Sigma[3, 3])  
rho23 <- Sigma[2, 3]/sqrt(Sigma[2, 2]*Sigma[3, 3])  
} 
 
 
Comments  
# Step 1 defines the multivariate probit element of the QSP-VAR linking observed positions 
to latent variables through a degenerate Bernoulli distribution (Lunn et al., 2006). 
 
# Step 2 sets the multivariate normal as a prior for the vector of latent variables (Lunn et al., 
2009). It is important to note that we also include the initial size of networks into the initial 
vector (i_X[i,5]<-i_net_size[i]). Hence, the initial vector contains a mix of latent 
variables, which are linked to binary outcomes, and a continuous variable.  
 
# Step 3 defines the vector z for exogenous variables. Based on our model, these exogenous 
variables only affect initial positions. Of course, this can be modified by including the vector 
z into the model for current positions. 
 
# Step 4 defines the prior for the precision matrix using an inverted Wishart distribution 
(Lunn et al., 2009). 
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# Step 5 specifies the mean equations for the initial positions. Initial positions depend on a set 
of exogenous variables, the ‘variables of fate’, which also affect network size in the fifth 
equation. 
 
# Step 6 applies weakly informative priors for parameters of the probit model based on 
Gelman et al. (2008). 
 
# Accordingly, Steps 1 to 6 explain how individuals obtained their initial positions (e.g. due 
to their education). Researchers might omit modelling starting points, depending on their 
access to exogenous variables. 
 
# Step 7 is similar to Step 1. 
 
# Step 8 is similar to Step 2. 
 
# Step 9 is similar to Step 4. 
 
# Step 10 represents the core element of the QSP-VAR as it specifies the mean equations for 
the current positions at t=2, which depend on initial positions at t=1 and the initial size of 
networks. Hence, Step 10 captures the autoregressive nature of the model. 
 
# Step 11 is similar to Step 6. 
 
# Step 12 explores correlations between current positions. As suggested in MODEL I, 
correlations should be considered before using a multivariate probit approach. If there is no 
evidence for correlation between latent variables, a univariate approach could be adopted 
reducing computation time. 
 
Different data formats for panel data 
OpenBUGS allows several methods to store panel data. Depending on the data format, the 
code needs to be adjusted.  
 
EXAMPLE: The position of three individuals measured at three points in time t=1, 2, 3. 
  t=1 t=2 t=3 
Individual 1 1 0 0 
Individual 2 0 1 1 
Individual 3 0 0 1 
 
Method I: One can use a two-dimensional array y[i,t] and store data as follows. 
y[ , 1] y[ , 2] y[ , 3] 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
 
Method II: We rename variables for different points in time using the prefix i_ for t=2 and ii_ 
for t=1. Hence, we store data as follows. 
ii_y[] i_y[] y[] 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
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In addition, there are alternative methods using nested indexing, where the cross-sectional 
and time dimension are combined using indices indicating individuals and time. In our code, 
we follow Method II and use a second dimension to combine variables (e.g. the four 
positions). Alternatively, Method I can be used, which when combining variables would lead 
to multidimensional arrays. If researchers stored their data using Method I, they can simply 
define identities such as y[i, 2]<-i_y[i] inside a loop for all i=1, 2, …, N and then use our 
code. Alternatively, they could modify our code using an additional loop for the time 
dimension. 
 
Extension for more than two points in time 
We can modify Step 10 in our code to permit additional points in time. We just focus on one 
position (e.g. being a CEO) to simply the notation and extend the time dimension to three 
points t=1, 2, 3.  
 
# Step 10 using data format based on Method II 
for (i in 1:N) { 
 p[i]<-constant+alpha*i_y[i] 
 i_p[i]<-constant+alpha*ii_y[i] 
 } 
 
So we need to state two equations for different time periods explicitly. Note that the 
parameters are constant over time, i.e. constant and alpha do not change. 
 
# Step 10 using data format based on Method I 
for (i in 1:N) { 
 for (t in 2:3) { 
  p[i,j]<-constant+alpha*y[i,j-1] 
  } 
 } 
 
Method I requires a double loop starting at t=2 and ending at t=3, which links y[i,2] and 
y[i,1] as well as y[i,3] and y[i,2]. Note that t=1 (and equivalently ii_y[i]) refer 
to the initial position. We also need to specify what happens in the initial period, where 
ii_p[i] (or p[i,1]) is determined. For instance, we could state that ii_p[i] (or 
p[i,1] ) is driven by exogenous factors (see Steps 1 to 6 in our code). 
 
